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Recent brain-to-brain interfacing studies provide proof of principle for the feasibility
of various forms of direct information transfer between two brains, and may lead to
the development of new approaches involving memory, emotions, or senses. What
makes brain-to-brain interfaces unique is the transfer of information representing specific
messages directly from one brain to another, without involving any activity of the
peripheral nervous system or senses. The article discusses ethical issues that arise in
neural interfacing. The focus is on the implications that brain-to-brain interfaces may have
on the individual at the recipient side.
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INTRODUCTION
For several years now, brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) in which
brain signals are used to navigate a computer, a prostheses or a
technical device, have been developed in various experimental
contexts (Wolpaw and Wolpaw, 2012; Grübler and Hildt, 2014).
Researchers have recently taken the next step and run experiments
based on connections between two brains. These so-called brain-
to-brain interfaces (abbreviation: BBIs or BTBIs) involve not only
a BCI component deriving information from a brain and sending
it to a computer, but also a computer-brain interface (CBI) com-
ponent delivering information to another brain. What results is
technology-mediated brain-to-brain communication (B2B com-
munication), i.e., direct communication between two brains that
does not involve any activity of the peripheral nervous system. In
what follows, ethical issues that arise in neural interfacing will be
discussed after a short introduction to recent BBI experiments. In
this, the focus will be on the implications BBIs may have on the
individual at the CBI side of the BBI, i.e., on the recipient.
RECENT EXPERIMENTS
In their experiments involving a non-invasive BBI, Yoo et al.
(2013) established functional links between the brain of a human
volunteer and the brain of a rat. The human participant initi-
ated an intention for intervention that was then transferred to an
anesthetized rat’s brain. This intention stimulated the motor area
responsible for tail movement and led to involuntary tail move-
ment. Technically, the experiment combined a BCI relying on
EEG-based steady-state visual evoked potential and a CBI using
transcranial focused ultrasound (FUS). FUS-based non-invasive
neuromodulation of the rat brain was triggered by a computer
when the human participant voluntarily started a thought pro-
cess representing the intention to stimulate the rat brain. The
intention was initiated by the participant looking at a strobe light
flickering on a computer screen. In case of high synchronization,
the FUS was triggered to transcranially modulate the anesthetized
rat brain’s motor cortex. Thus, the human subject was able to
initiate (and thus control) the rat’s tail movement via the BBI
mediated “on–off” trigger.
In a similar experiment, Pais-Vieira et al. (2013) used a BBI
to transfer behaviorally meaningful sensorimotor information
from the brain of one rat (the “encoder” rat) to the brain of
another rat (the “decoder” rat). In the study, while the encoder
rat accomplished a sensorimotor task requiring the selection from
two stimuli, cortical activity was recorded and transferred directly
to the decoder rat’s corresponding cortical areas via intracorti-
cal microstimulation. The sensorimotor information transferred
via the BBI guided the decoder rat to learn similar behavioral
choices, i.e., based solely on the neural patterns originating from
the encoder rat. Furthermore, when the decoder animal’s task
performance was fed back to the encoder animal, continuous
BBI operation influenced the encoder rat’s neural activity and
behavior. Overall, the BBI provided a “direct channel for behav-
ioral information exchange” between two interconnected brains
that allowed real-time sharing of sensorimotor information (Pais-
Vieira et al., 2013, p. 6). The authors go on to state that these
results “indicate that animal brain dyads or even brain net-
works could allow animal groups to synchronize their behaviors
following neuronal-based cues.” (Pais-Vieira et al., 2013, p. 6).
A related study not based on BBIs but involving a similar
donor/recipient design, was done byDeadwyler et al. (2013). Via a
mathematical model they derived information encoding patterns
from the hippocampus of “donor” rats well trained in a specified
paradigm and delivered the information via electrical stimulation
to “recipient” rats that had never before been exposed to the
specific character of this task. The transfer of the model-derived
hippocampal firing pattern from the trained donor animals to
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naïve recipient animals via stimulation facilitated the recipient
animals’ task performance. As there was a time delay in between
the encoding phase of the task and the behavioral response in
the recipient animal, the study shows the transfer of a memory
code, quite in contrast to the BBI-based study by Pais-Vieira
et al. (2013) which relies on the immediate induction of a motor
response.
Recently, Grau et al. (2014) provided the first example of
conscious transmission of information between humans via a
non-invasive BBI based on a BCI using motor imagery-controlled
electroencephalography and a CBI that used transcranial mag-
netic stimulation (TMS) to induce the conscious perception of
phosphenes, i.e., the experience of seeing light. The receiver sub-
jects on the CBI side of the BBI were able to decipher the
transmitted phosphene sequences carrying encrypted messages
that coded for words such as hola” or “ciao.”
Furthermore, there are speculations concerning possible
future bidirectional BBI applications. For example, Yoo et al.
(2013, p. 7) assume that “if both BCI and CBI are implemented
between two awake human subjects, the information flow could
be made bidirectional and communicative between apperceptive
identities/individuals.”
Possible future applications beyond the laboratory that have
been envisioned include the use of BBIs in the military or in other
professional contexts where they may allow for silent commands
or may serve to synchronize behavior of a larger group of indi-
viduals. Further, applications may be seen in computer gaming,
in enhancing human sensory capacities or in providing support
to individuals with severe motor impairments (cf. Trimper et al.,
2014).
NEED FOR ETHICAL REFLECTION
The recent studies provide proof of principle for the feasibility of
various forms of direct information transfer between two brains,
and may lead to the development of new approaches involving
memory, emotions or senses. In view of these seminal publica-
tions on BBIs allowing information transfer between animals,
between humans, and between animals and humans, there is a
clear need for thorough ethical reflection.
BBIs combine the recording of brain signals on the side of
the sender and brain stimulation on the side of the recipient.
Each of these strategies raises a broad spectrum of ethical issues
that are currently being discussed in contexts such as brain-
computer interfaces, deep brain stimulation, or intrasurgical
brain stimulation (Freudenstein et al., 2005; Grübler and Hildt,
2014; Unterrainer and Oduncu, 2015). What makes BBIs unique,
however, is the transfer of information representing specific mes-
sages directly from one brain to another, without involving any
activity of the peripheral nervous system or senses. On the side
of the recipient, BBIs involve a form of information input not
seen so far. Furthermore, whereas the specific “meaning” of the
transferred signal is clearly defined by the technical system, the
behavioral implications may be far from clear.
As BBI technology currently is in the very first stages of basic
research, the ethical aspects raised in this contribution are spec-
ulative to a considerable degree. Nevertheless, it is important to
reflect on these issues right now. The results will be of relevance to
the design of possible future BBI studies involving human subjects
and will give an idea of the broader implications and possible
future uses of the BBI technology.
SOME GENERAL ASPECTS
But what exactly are the ethical issues possibly arising in brain-to-
brain interfaces?
First of all, as in any kind of research involving human subjects,
health-related safety issues have to be taken into consideration. In
invasive systems that require surgery, there are risks concerning
brain lesions. Furthermore, both in invasive and in non-invasive
systems, some more indirect effects may arise: the recurring acti-
vation of specified pathways or brain regions both on the BCI
part and the CBI part may influence brain functioning in various
aspects.
In BBI use issues regarding agency, responsibility and liability
undoubtedly will play a role (O’Brolchain andGordijn, 2014; Vlek
et al., 2014). Whereas traditional legal regulations concerning
responsibility and liability in technology use may be applica-
ble to BCIs, as suggested by several authors (Tamburrini, 2009;
Clausen, 2011; Grübler, 2011), the fact that in BBIs two per-
sons are involved complicates things considerably. The concept of
“shared control” (Tamburrini, 2009), stating that in BCI use the
user and the technical system together share control in achieving
the output signal, undoubtedly applies to BBIs as well. Unlike in
BCIs, however, there is not one person involved, but two, both
of them not fully aware of their exact respective role in the sys-
tem (cf. Vlek et al., 2014). Any ascription of responsibility for
the outcome of any activity involving BBI functioning will be
complicated by the BBI characteristic that the encoder may have
initiated or significantly influenced a behavior or some sort of
activity the decoder is performing (Trimper et al., 2014). Who
is responsible for the consequences of activities in which BBIs are
involved? The sender, i.e., the person involved in the BCI part?
The recipient? The experimenter? The technical device? It may
be speculated whether a concept of “hybrid agencies” (Suchman,
2007) involving several human actors might be applicable
to BBIs.
Being part of a brain–brain dyad or a multi-brain system may
also have complex repercussions on a person’s concept of self,
and raises questions concerning self-perception, individuality and
body ownership (Hildt, 2011). For example, as an encoder, what
is it like to be aware of another person exerting some behavior
initiated or influenced by oneself? Will it be possible to clearly
separate one’s concept of self and the other?
Furthermore, complex problems with regard to privacy may
arise, especially when the BCI component uses signals the sender
is not aware of or signals the sender cannot control (Tamburrini,
2009; Trimper et al., 2014). Thus, it will be crucial to clearly define
and explicitly state what kind of information will be transferred
and to provide the sender with adequate measures to control the
information transfer process. The same holds for the recipient in
order to avoid the unconsented intrusion of information.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RECIPIENT
Imagine a BBI that transmits information that serves to mechan-
ically make the decoder slightly move his left forefinger, in a
method similar to the experiments run by Yoo et al. (2013) where
BBI activity resulted in an anesthetized rat moving its tail. The
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recipient probably realizes that something is going on (his fin-
ger is moving in an automatic manner) and—being aware of the
BBI and its usual function—will deduce that some information is
being transferred. Thus, he probably will not ascribe authorship
to himself for this movement. However, the situation will be dif-
ferent if the recipient is able to actively control the outcome of
the information transfer, i.e., to actively control whether or not a
certain movement finally occurs. For example, a person may be
able to suppress the movement in question, or the BBI may solely
confer a signal that serves as a stimulus for further action.
Now imagine a more flexible BBI in which various different
patterns are enacted that elicit different types of reactions in the
recipient. In case of five to ten different movement patterns con-
veyed via the BBI, would the recipient still be sure whether it is
himself or the BBI that is initiating or controlling the movements?
I have doubts. This uncertainty may lead him to erroneously
ascribe authorship to himself for these movements (cf. Wegner,
2002; Vlek et al., 2014).
The same holds true, with even more complex implications, in
cases where a BBI was able to elicit different types of emotions
or memories. In a hypothetical situation where a BBI transmits
a memory code that makes the recipient recall seeing a blue ball,
the recipient may be clearly aware of the fact that his recurrent
recalling of a blue ball may result from a BBI whose sole function
is to elicit this urge.With a higher number of different stimulation
patterns available, this connection will vanish so that it will be
increasingly difficult for the recipient to know whether it is he or
the BBI who induces a certain movement, emotion or memory.
Furthermore, the transfer of emotions will considerably influence
the recipient’s overall well-being.
For example, in a scenario of memory transfer in humans,
similar to the experiment in rats carried out by Deadwyler et al.
(2013), the recipient would end up having two types of memo-
ries: his own genuine memories and the quasi-memories1 trans-
ferred via the BBI technology. However, he would not be able to
distinguish between his own genuine memories and the quasi-
memories. As for quasi-memories, the same problems arise for
quasi-olfactory experiences or for quasi-emotions elicited in the
context of BBI use. The recipient would no longer know for cer-
tain which of his memories, sensory experiences or emotions are
genuine and which are his quasi-memories, quasi-sensations or
quasi-emotions resulting from BBI information transfer. In view
of this, the recipient’s sense of identity would be highly questioned
[cf. the philosophical debate run by Shoemaker (1970), Williams
(1976), Parfit (1984), and others].
In contrast, no direct identity issues arise in the conscious
information transfer described by Grau et al. (2014). In their
BBI experiment, the CBI elicits phosphenes in the recipient that
1The term “quasi-memory” has been coined by the American philosopher
Sydney Shoemaker. He describes “quasi-memory knowledge” as “a kind of
knowledge of past events such that someone’s having this sort of knowledge
of an event does involve there being a correspondence between his present
cognitive state and a past cognitive and sensory state that was of the event, but
such that this correspondence, although otherwise just like that which exists
in memory, does not necessarily involve that past state’s having been a state
of the very same person who subsequently has the knowledge.” (Shoemaker,
1970, p. 271).
code for specific words. The recipient is aware of the information
transfer process which involves active deciphering.
NEURAL INTERFACING, NEURAL GRAFTING, AND CROSS
SPECIES EXPERIMENTS
It is worthwhile to compare neural interfacing with the ethical
issues raised by other biomedical approaches. In particular, neu-
ral tissue transplantation is of interest here since the strategies of
neural interfacing and neural grafting both involve the possibility
of additional content being transferred to a brain.
Neural tissue transplantation studies in Parkinson’s disease
patients were run mainly in the 1980s and 1990s. They aimed
at replacing loss of dopaminergic neurons in the brains of
Parkinson’s disease patients by transplanting mesencephalic tis-
sue from the developing brain of aborted human embryos and
fetuses into the patient’s brain (Barker et al., 2013).
In the context of these clinical grafting trials, guidelines were
developed that addressed ethical issues in the retrieval and use
of human embryonic and fetal material. Some of them, among
other aspects, contain a paragraph that serves to exclude the
possibility of “personality transfer” or any risk of transfer of indi-
vidual characteristics from the brain tissue donor to the recipient
(British Medical Association, 1988; Dickson, 1989; Boer, 1994).
For example, the “NECTAR ethical guidelines for the retrieval
and use of human embryonic or fetal donor tissue for experimen-
tal and clinical neurotransplantation and research” developed by
the Network of European CNS Transplantation And Restoration
(NECTAR), say in point 7: “Nervous tissue may be used for
transplantation as suspended cell preparations or tissue frag-
ments” (Boer, 1994, p. 3). Allowing only cell preparations or
tissue fragments to be transplanted serves to avoid the trans-
fer of any of the donor’s individual characteristics to the graft
recipient.
Even if for practical reasons a “personality transfer” or the
transfer of individual characteristics is very unlikely to occur in
brain tissue transplantations, the guidelines considered this con-
cern by having a paragraph that explicitly rules out this possibility
in clinical transplantation studies. BBIs, however, directly involve
the very issue that these guidelines attempt to avoid in the case
of clinical neural tissue transplantation: the transfer of individual
characteristics from a donor to a recipient, such as for example
in the transfer of a memory code. Whereas in neural grafting a
material substrate, i.e., brain tissue, is transferred, in BBIs there
is a direct transfer of information from one brain to another.
What matters from an ethical point of view is the same in both
approaches. The possibility of transfer of individual characteris-
tics. This discrepancy points to a clear need for further reflection
on the ethical issues involved in the transfer of information in
BBIs involving humans.
Cross species neural interfacing experiments also raise tricky
ethical issues (cf. Trimper et al., 2014). With regard to research
involving animals containing human material (ACHM), some
ethical reflection currently is going on. For example, the
government-commissioned report “Animals Containing Human
Material” from the UK Academy of Medical Sciences (2011)
identifies a category (Category 2) of ethically sensitive research
involving ACHM which should be approached with caution but
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could go ahead if approval by a specialist committee on a case-
by-case basis is obtained (cf. Abbott, 2011). Among others, this
category includes research that involves the modification of ani-
mal brains, other than non-human primates, “that may make
the brain function potentially more ‘human-like”’ (Academy of
Medical Sciences, 2011, p. 110).
The introduction of more “human-like” function into an ani-
mal brain via BBIs is not totally out of reach. A possible example
is the BBI-induced transfer of the ability to distinguish between
different words or commands (such as left, right, up, down)
and to behave accordingly. Thus, some of the considerations
of animals containing human material may apply to BBI tech-
nologies as well. Furthermore, in BBIs, information transfer may
also emanate from an animal to a human being. For example,
(Trimper et al., 2014, p. 2) speculate on possible future inter-
species BBI uses such as enhancing human sensory systems or
“aiding in search-and-rescue operations, linking our brains with
those of the search-and-rescue animal. ” In analogy to the point
raised above with regard to animals containing human material
(ACHM), there is a clear need for further reflection on the ethi-
cal issues involved in attempts to modify the brains of humans in
ways that might result in some “animal-like” functions.
CONCLUSION
Current BBI research opens up fascinating new communica-
tion pathways but also raises considerable practical and ethical
questions. One of the central questions is whether there actu-
ally is a need for direct brain-to-brain communication. At least
at the moment, it seems doubtful whether there are broader
applications for such a complex, rigid and expensive technology.
Furthermore, in view of the complex ethical implications arising
in the BBI recipient described above, the spectrum of possible
ethically acceptable BBIs seems rather limited.
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